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Abstract. This paper investigates the possibilities of steganographically embedding information in the "noise" created by automatic translation of natural language documents. Because the inherent redundancy of
natural language creates plenty of room for variation in translation, machine translation is ideal for steganographic applications. Also, because
there are frequent errors in legitimate automatic text translations, additional errors inserted by an information hiding mechanism are plausibly
undetectable and would appear to be part of the normal noise associated
with translation. Significantly, it should be extremely difficult for an adversary to determine if inaccuracies in the translation are caused by the
use of steganography or by deficiencies of the translation software.

1

Introduction

This paper presents a new protocol for covert message transfer in natural language text, for which we have a proof-of-concept implementation. The key idea is
to hide information in the noise that occurs invariably in natural language translation. When translating a non-trivial text between a pair of natural languages,
there are typically many possible translations. Selecting one of these translations can be used to encode information. In order for an adversary to detect the
hidden message transfer, the adversary would have to show that the generated
translation containing the hidden message could not be plausibly generated by
ordinary translation. Because natural language translation is particularly noisy,
this is inherently difficult. For example, the existence of synonyms frequently
allows for multiple correct translations of the same text. The possibility of erroneous translations increases the number of plausible variations and thus the
opportunities for hiding information.
This paper evaluates the potential of covert message transfer in natural language translation that uses automatic machine translation (MT). In order to
characterize which variations in machine translations are plausible, we have
looked into the different kinds of errors that are generated by various MT systems. Some of the variations that were observed in the machine translations are
also clearly plausible for manual translations by humans.

C. Grothoff, K. Grothoff, L. Alkhutova, R. Stutsman, M. Atallah

2

In addition to making it difficult for the adversary to detect the presence of a
hidden message, translation-based steganography is also easier to use. The reason for this is that unlike previous text-, image- or sound-based steganographic
systems, the substrate does not have to be secret. In translation-based steganography, the original text in the source language can be publically known, obtained
from public sources, and, together with the translation, exchanged between the
two parties in plain sight of the adversary. In traditional image steganography,
the problem often occurs that the source image in which the message is subsequently hidden must be kept secret by the sender and used only once (as
otherwise a "diff" attack would reveal the presence of a hidden message). This
burdens the user with creating a new, secret substrate for each message.
Translation-based steganography does not suffer from this drawback, since
the adversary cannot apply a differential analysis to a translation to detect the
hidden message. The adversary may produce a translation of the original message, but the translation is likely to differ regardless of the use of steganography,
making the differential analysis useless for detecting a hidden message.
To demonstrate this, we have implemented a steganographic encoder and decoder. The system hides messages by changing machine translations in ways that
are similar to the variations and errors that were observed in the existing MT
systems. An interactive version of the prototype is available on our webpage. 1
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. First, Section 2 reviews
related work. In Section 3, the basic protocol of the steganographic exchange is
described. In Section 4, we give a characterization of errors produced in existing
machine translation systems. The implementation and some experimental results
are sketched in Section 5. In Section 6, we discuss variations on the basic protocol,
together with various attacks and possible defenses.

2

Related Work

The goal of both steganography and watermarking is to embed information into
a digital object, also referred to as the substrate, in such a manner that the
information becomes part of the object. It is understood that the embedding
process should not significantly degrade the quality of the substrate. Steganographic and watermarking schemes are categorized by the type of data that the
substrate belongs to, such as text, images or sound.
2.1

Steganography

In steganography, the very existence of the message must not be detectable.
A successful attack consists of detecting the existence of the hidden message,
even without removing it (or learning what it is). This can be done through, for
example, sophisticated statistical analyses and comparisons of objects with and
without hidden information.
1

http://www.cs.purdue.edu/homes/rstutsma/stego/
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Traditional linguistic steganography has used limited syntactically-correct
text generation [28] (sometimes with the addition of so-called "style templates")
and semantically-equivalent word substitutions within an existing plaintext as
a medium in which to hide messages. Wayner [28,29] introduced the notion of
using precomputed context-free grammars as a method of generating steganographic text without sacrificing syntactic and semantic correctness. Note that
semantic correctness is only guaranteed if the manually constructed grammar
enforces the production of semantically cohesive text. Chapman and Davida [6]
improved on the simple generation of syntactically correct text by syntactically
tagging large corpora of homogeneous data in order to generate grammatical
"style templates"; these templates were used to generate text which not only
had syntactic and lexical variation, but whose consistent register and "style"
could potentially pass a casual reading by a human observer. Chapman et al [7],
later developed a technique in which semantically equivalent substitutions were
made in known plaintexts in order to encode messages. Semantically-driven information hiding is a relatively recent innovation, as described for watermarking
schemes in Atallah et al [4]. Wayner [28,29] detailed text-based approaches that
are strictly statistical in nature. However, in general, linguistic approaches to
steganography have been relatively limited. Damage to language is relatively
easy for a human to detect. It does not take much modification of a text to
make it ungrammatical in a native speaker's judgement; furthermore, even syntactically correct texts can violate semantic constraints.
Non-linguistic approaches to steganography have sometimes used lower-order
bits in images and sound encodings to hide the data, providing a certain amount
of freedom in the encoding in which to hide information [29]. The problem with
these approaches is that the information is easily destroyed (the encoding lacks
robustness, which is a particular problem for watermarking), that the original
data source (for example the original image) must not be disclosed to avoid
easy detection, and that a statistical analysis can still often detect the use of
steganography (see, e.g., [13,18,20,25,29], to mention a few).
2.2

Watermarking

The intended purpose of the watermark largely dictates the design goals for watermarking schemes. The possible uses of watermarking include inserting ownership information, inserting purchaser information, detecting modification, placing caption information and so on. One such decision is whether the watermark
should be visible or indiscernible. For example, a copyright mark need not be
hidden; in fact, a visible digital watermark can act as a deterrent to an attacker.
Most of the literature has focused on indiscernible watermarks.
Watermarks are usually designed to withstand a wide range of attacks that
aim at removing or modifying the watermark without significantly damaging the
usefulness of the object. A resilient watermark is one that is hard to remove by
an adversary without damaging the object to an unaceptable extent. However, it
is sometimes the case that a fragile watermark is desirable, one that is destroyed
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by even a small alteration; this occurs when watermarking is used for the purpose
of making the object tamper-evident (for integrity protection).
The case where the watermark has to be different for each copy of the digital
object, is called fingerprinting. That is, fingerprinting embeds a unique message
in each instance of the digital object (usually the message makes it possible to
trace a pirated version back to the original culprit). Fingerprinting is easier to
attack because two differently marked copies often make possible an attack that
consists of comparing the two differently marked copies (the attacker's goal is
then to create a usable copy that has neither one of the two marks).
Although watermarks can be embedded in any digital object, by far most of
the published research on watermarking has dealt with media such as images,
audio or video. There is some literature on watermarking other object types like
software [9-11], databases [1,26], and natural language text [3,4].
2.3

Machine Translation

Most Machine Translation (MT) systems in use today are statistical MT systems
based on models derived from a corpus, transfer systems that are based on
linguistic rules for the translations, or hybrid systems that combine the two
approaches. Other translation methodologies, such as semantic MT exist, but
are not considered further as they are not commonly available at this time.
In statistical MT [2, 5], the system is trained using a bilingual parallel corpus
to construct a translation model. The translation model gives the translator statistical information about likely word alignments. A word alignment [23,24] is
a correspondence between words in the source sentence and the target sentence.
For example, for English-French translations, the system "learns" that the English word "not" typically corresponds to the two French words "ne pas". The
statistical MT systems are also trained with a uni-lingual corpus in the target
language to construct a language model which is used to estimate what constructions are common in the target language. The translator then performs an
approximate search in the space of all possible translations, trying to maximize
the likelihood of the translation to score high in both the translation model and
the language model. The selection of the training data for the construction of
the models is crucial for the quality of the statistical MT system.

3

Protocol

The basic steganographic protocol for this paper works as follows. The sender
first needs to obtain a substrate text in the source language. The substrate does
not have to be secret and can be obtained from public sources - for example, a
news website. The sender then translates the sentences in the source text into the
target language using the steganographic encoder. The steganographic encoder
essentially creates multiple translations for each sentence and selects one of these
to encode bits from the hidden message. The translated text is then transmitted
to the receiver, together with information that is sufficient to obtain the source
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text. This can either be the source text itself or a reference to the source. The
receiver then also performs the translation of the source text using the same
steganographic encoder configuration. By comparing the resulting sentences, the
receiver reconstructs the bitstream of the hidden message. Figure 1 illustrates
the basic protocol.

substrate source

secret configuration

~

~

Itranslators I

t.

hidden
data ~

~ans1at~o~

Iencode I

~
Alice

translation
substrate source

hidden
data

~

Idecode I
~
• Bob

Fig. 1. Illustration of the basic protocol. The adversary can observe the public news
and the message between Alice and Bob containing the selected translation and the
(possibly public) substrate source.

The adversary is assumed to know about the existence of this basic protocol
and is also able to obtain the source text and to perform translations. It is not
practical for the adversary to flag all seemingly machine-translated messages
which do not correspond exactly to translations generated from the cover source
by well-known MT systems. There are two reasons for this. First, there are too
many variants of MT software out there (frequently produced by "tweaking"
existing ones), many of which are not advertised or made public. Second, even if
there was a single universal MT software copy that everyone uses, there are still
wildly differing behaviors for it depending on the corpus on which it is trained there are too many such potential corpora to track, especially as users seek better
translation quality by using a corpus particularly suited to their application
domain (e.g., news stories about home construction costs and markets).
The adversary does not have access to the specific configuration of the steganographic encoder (which acts like a secret key). This configuration consists of everything that determines which translations are generated, such as the specific
translation algorithms, the corpora used to train any user-generated translation
systems which may be employed, rules, and dictionaries. It is assumed that the
secret is transmitted using standard secret-sharing protocols and the specifics
are not covered here. However, it should be noted that the size of the secret
that is transmitted is flexible, based upon the user's choices; users can choose to
simply share information about the settings of the encoder, or might choose to
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transmit entire corpora used to train a user-generated MT system. This varies
based upon individual users' needs.
As with most steganographic systems, the hidden message itself can be encrypted with a secret key, making it harder for the adversary to perform guessing
attacks on the secret configuration (as configurations of the steganographic system result in a random bitstream for the hidden message).
3.1

Producing translations

The first step for both sender and receiver after obtaining the source text is to
produce multiple translations of the source text using the same algorithm. The
goal of this step is to deterministically produce multiple different translations of
the source text. The simplest approach to achieve this is to apply (a subset of)
all available MT systems on each sentence in the source text. If the parties have
full access to the code of a statistical MT system, they can generate multiple
MT systems from the same codebase by training it with different corpora.
In addition to generating different sentences using multiple translation systems it is also possible to apply post-processing on the resulting translations to
obtain additional variations. Such post-processing includes transformations that
mimic the noise inherent in any (MT) translation. For example, post-processors
could insert common translation mistakes (as discussed in Section 4).
As translation quality differs between different engines and also depends on
which post-processors were applied to manipulate the result, the translation
system uses a heuristic to assign a probability to each translation that describes
its relative quality compared to the other translations. The heuristic can be
based on both experience with the generators and algorithms that rank sentence
quality based on language models [8]. The specific set of translation engines,
training corpora and post-processing operations that are used to generate the
translations and their ranking are part of the secret shared by the two parties
that want to carry out the covert communication.
3.2

Selecting a translation

When selecting a translation to encode the hidden message, the encoder first
builds a Huffman tree [17] of the available translations using the probabilities
assigned by the generator algorithm. Then the algorithm selects the sentence
that corresponds to the bit-sequence that is to be encoded. 2
Using a Huffman tree to select sentences in accordance with their translation
quality estimate ensures that sentences that are assumed to have a low translation quality are selected less often. Furthermore, the lower the quality of the
selected translation, the higher the number of transmitted bits.
This reduces the total amount of substrate text required and thus the amount
of text the adversary can analyze. The encoder can use a lower limit on the
2

Wayner [28, 29] uses Huffman trees in a similar manner to generate statistically
plausible substrate texts on a letter-by-letter basis.
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relative translation quality to eliminate sentences from consideration where the
estimated translation quality is below a certain threshold, in which case that
threshold becomes part of the shared secret between sender and receiver.
3.3

Keeping the source text secret

The presented scheme can be adapted to be suitable for watermarking where it
would be desirable to keep the source text secret. This can be achieved as follows.
The encoder computes a (cryptographic) hash of each translated sentence. It then
selects a sentence such that the last bit of the hash of the translated sentence
corresponds to the next bit in the hidden message that is to be transmitted.
The decoder then just computes the hash codes of the received sentences and
concatenates the respective lowest bits to obtain the hidden message.
This scheme assumes that sentences are long enough to almost always have
enough variation to obtain a hash with the desired lowest bit. Error-correcting
codes must be used to correct errors whenever none of the sentences produces
an acceptable hash code. Using this variation reduces the bitrate that can be
achieved by the encoding. More details on this can be found in Section 6.

4

Lost in Translation

Modern MT systems produce a number of common errors in translations. This
section characterizes some of these errors. While the errors we describe are not
a comprehensive list of possible errors, they are representative of the types of
errors we commonly observed in our sample translations. Most of these errors
are caused by the reliance on statistical and syntactic text analysis by contemporary MT systems, resulting in a lack of semantic and contextual awareness.
This produces an array of error types that we can use to plausibly alter text,
generating further marking possibilities.
4.1

Functional Words

One class of errors that occurs rather frequently without destroying meaning
is that of incorrectly-translated or omitted closed-class words such as articles,
pronouns, and prepositions. Because these functional words are often strongly
associated with some other word or phrase in the sentence, complex constructions often seem to lead to errors in the translation of such words. Furthermore,
different languages handle these words very differently, leading to translation
errors when using engines that do not handle these differences.
For example, languages without articles, such as Russian, can produce articleomission errors when translating to a language which has articles, like English:
"Behind sledge cheerfully to run" [12].
Even if articles are included, they often have the wrong sense of definiteness
("a" instead of "the", and vice-versa). Finally, if both languages have articles

8

C. Grothoff, K. Grothoff, L. Alkhutova, R. Stutsman, M. Atallah

these articles are sometimes omitted in translations where the constructions
become complex enough to make the noun phrase the article is bound to unclear.
Many languages use articles in front of some nouns, but not others. This
causes problems when translating from languages that do use articles in front of
the latter set of nouns. For example, the French sentence "La vie est paralysee."
translates to "Life is paralyzed." in English. However, translation engines predictably translate this as "The life is paralyzed.". "life" in the sense of "life in
general" does not take an article in English. This is the same with many mass
nouns like "water" and "money", causing similar errors.
Furthermore, because articles are also used as pronouns in many languages,
they are often mistranslated as such. Many of these languages also indicate
gender with articles and pronouns, such that if "the armchair" is male, it might
be referred to as "he" (in English) at the beginning of the next sentence, instead
of "it". But because no context is kept by todays MT engines, if there is a man
being discussed in the previous sentence, he may also become an "it" in the next.
For example, the following two sentences were translated from a German
article into English with Systran (The "Avineri" mentioned is a political scientist
cited in the article): "Avineri ist nicht nur skeptisch. Er ist gleichzeitig auch
optimistisch." is translated as "Avineri is not only sceptical. It is at the same
time also optimistic." [22,27]. This lack of context makes correctly translating
such words difficult.
Prepositions are also notoriously tricky; often, the correct choice of preposition depends entirely on the context of the sentence. For example, "J'habite
d 100 metres de lui" in French means "I live 100 meters from him" in English.
However, [27] translates this as "I live with 100 meters of him", and [12] translates it as "In live in 100 meters of him." Both use a different translation of "a"
("with/in") which is entirely inappropriate to the context.
"ll est mort a 92 ans" ("He died at 92 years") is given by [27,12] as "He
died in 92 years". To say "He waits for me" in German, one generally says "Er
wartet auf mich". [27] chooses to omit the preposition ("auf" entirely, making
the sentence incorrect (effectively, "He waits me.") Similarly, "Bei der Hochzeit
waren viele Freunde" ("Many friends were at the wedding") yields "With the
wedding were many friends." In each of these cases, a demonstrably incorrect
translation (in context) for the preposition occurs.
Another example is the following: in German, "nach Hause" and "zu Hause"
both translate roughly into English as "home". The difference between the two
is that one means "towards home" and the other means "at home" . Because we
can say in English "I'm going home" and "I'm staying home", we don't need
to mention "towards" or "at". When translating these two sentences to German
without explicitly stating" at home" in the second sentence, however, the engines
we examined produced incoherent sentences. [12] translated it as "Ich bleibe nach
Hause" ("I'm staying to home"), and [27] rendered a completely nonsensical "Ich
bleibe Haupt" ("I'm staying head").
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Granunar Errors

Sometimes, even more basic grammar fails. While this may simply be a measure
of a sentence being so complicated that a verb's subject cannot be found, it is
still quite noticeable when, for example, the wrong conjugation of a verb is used.
In the following translation, "It appeared concerned about the expressions of
the presidency candidate the fact that it do not fight the radical groups in the
Gaza Strip" [22,27], the third-person singular subject appears directly before
the verb, and still the wrong form of the verb is chosen.
4.3

Word-for-Word Translations

One phenomenon which occurs again and again is the use of partial or complete
word-for-word translations of constructions which are not grammatically correct
in the target language. At best, this only results in word-order issues: "Was aber
erwartet Israel wirklich von den Paliistinensern nach der Wahl am 9.1.?" ("But
what does Israel really expect from the Palestians after the election on January 9?") is translated by [27J as "What however really expects Israel from the
Palestinians after the choice on 9.1.?" In this case, the meaning is not hampered
because the construction is fairly simple, and the words translate well between
the two languages. However, in a language like Russian where possession is indicated by something being "at" the owner, translation for things like "I have the
pencils" in Russian come out as "the pencils are at me" in a word-for-word English translation. Unnatural constructions based on word-for-word translations
are by far the most noticeable flaw in many of the translations we looked at.
4.4

Blatant Word Choice Errors

Less frequently, a completely unrelated word or phrase is chosen in the translation. For example, "I'm staying home" and "I am staying home" are both
translated into German by [27J as "Ich bleibe Haupt" ("I'm staying head") instead of "Ich bleibe zu Hause". These are different from semantic errors and
reflect some sort of flaw in the actual engine or its dictionary, dearly impacting
translation quality.
4.5

Context and Semantics

As mentioned previously, the fact that most translation systems do not keep
context makes translation problematic. The Bare Bones Guide to HTML [30] is
a document giving basic web page authoring information. When the simplified
Chinese translation of this document's entry for an HTML "Menu List" is translated into English, however, the result is "The vegetable unitarily enumerates"
[32,27]. While one can see that whatever the Chinese phrase for "Menu List"
is might in fact have something to do with a vegetable, the context information
should lead to a choice that does not have to do with food. Similarly, the German translation ([27]) of "I ran through the woods" gives a translation ("Ieh
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lief durch das Holz") that implies running through the substance "wood", not
the "forest" sense. Without having enough contextual information, either based
on statistics or the preceding verb/preposition combination, the translator is
unable to decide that a forest is more likely to be run through than lumber is,
and chooses the wrong word.
4.6

Additional Errors

Several other interesting error types were encountered which, for space reasons,
we will only describe briefly.
- In many cases, words that are not in the source dictionary simply go untranslated; for example, an English translation of the registration for a Dutch
news site gives "These can contain no spaties or leestekens" for "Deze mag
geen spaties of leestekens bevatten."
- Many languages use reflexive verbs to describe certain actions which are not
reflexive in other languages; the reflexive article is often translated regardless
of whether it is needed in the second language (e.g. "Ich kaemme mich"
becomes "I comb myself").
Proper names which also translate to common words are sometimes translated; "Linda es muy Linda" ("Linda is very beautiful") is translated by [27]
as "It is continguous is very pretty" and "Pretty it is very pretty" by [12].
Moving the name does not always stop it from being translated, even when
capitalized.
- Verb tense is often inexact in translation, as there is often no direct mapping
between verb tenses in different languages.
4.7

Translations between Typologically Dissimilar Languages

Typologically distant languages are languages whose formal structures differ
radically from one another. These structural differences manifest themselves in
many areas (e.g. syntax (phrase and sentence structure), semantics (meaning
structure) and morphology (word structure)). Not surprisingly, because of these
differences, translations between languages that are typologically distant (Chinese and English, English and Arabic, etc) are frequently so bad as to be incoherent or unreadable. We did not consider these languages for this work, since the
translation quality is often so poor that exchange of the resulting translations
would likely be implausible.
For example, when translating the "Bare Bones Guide to HTML" page from
Japanese [31] to English, [27J gives "Chasing order, link to the HTML guide
whom it explained and is superior WWW Help Page is reference." (Note that
italicized portions were already in English on the Japanese page) The original
English from which the Japanese was manually translated reads: "If you're looking for more detailed step-by-step information, see my WWW Help Page." The
original English sentence is provided only for general meaning here, but it is clear
that what is translated into English by the MT system is incomprehensible.

Translation-based Steganography
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Because many translation systems were originally designed as a rough "first
pass" for human translators who know both languages, it may well be that
knowing the original language makes it possible to understand what is meant
in the translation; in some sense, translators using such a tool would have to
consciously or unconsciously be aware of the error types generated by the translation tool in order to produce accurate translations from it. While we did not
explore these error types for this paper, an area for future improvement would
be to look into the error types in various language pairs by asking bilinguals
about the translations.

5

Implementation

This section describes some of the aspects of the implementation with focus
on the different techniques that are used to obtain variations in the generated
translations.
5.1

'Iranslation Engines

The current implementation uses different translation services that are available
on the Internet to obtain an initial translation. The current implementation
supports three different services, and we plan on adding more in the future.
Adding a new service only requires writing a function that translates a given
sentence from a source language to the target language. Which subset of the
available MT services should be used is up to the user to decide, but at least
one engine must be selected.
A possible problem with selecting multiple different translation engines is
that they might have distinct error characteristics (for example, one engine might
not translate words with contractions). An adversary that is aware of such problems with a specific machine translation system might find out that half of all
sentences have errors that match those characteristics. Since a normal user is
unlikely to alternate between different translation engines, this would reveal the
presence of a hidden message.
A better alternative is to use the same machine translation software but train
it with different corpora. The specific corpora become part of the secret key used
by the steganographic encoder; this use of a corpus as a key was previously discussed in another context [4]. As such, the adversary could no longer detect
differences that are the result of a different machine translation algorithm. One
problem with this approach is that acquiring good corpora is expensive. Furthermore, dividing a single corpus to generate multiple smaller corpora will result in
worse translations, which can again lead to suspicious texts. That said, having
full control over the translation engine may also allow for minor variations in
the translation algorithm itself. For example, the GIZA++ system offers multiple algorithms for computing translations [14]. These algorithms mostly differ
in how translation "candidate outcomes" are generated. Changing these options
can also help to generate multiple translations.
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After obtaining one or more translations from the translation engines, the tool
produces additional variations using various post-processing algorithms. Problems with using multiple engines can be avoided by just using one high-quality
translation engine and relying on the post-processing to generate alternative
translations.

5.2

Semantic Substitution

Semantic substitution is one highly effective post-pass and has been used in
previous approaches to hide information [4,7]. One key difference from previous
work is that errors arising from semantic substitution are more plausible in
translations compared to semantic substitutions in an ordinary text.
A typical problem with traditional semantic substitution is the need for substitution lists. A substitution list is a list of tuples consisting of words that are
semantically close enough that subtituting one word for another in an arbitrary
sentence is possible. For traditional semantic substitution, these lists are generated by hand. An example of a pair of words in a semantic substitution list
would be comfortable and convenient. Not only is constructing substitution
lists by hand tedious, but the lists must also be conservative in what they contain. For example, general substitution lists cannot contain word pairs such as
bright and light since light could have been used in a different sense (meaning
effortless, unexacting or even used as a noun).
Semantic substitution on translations does not have this problem. Using the
original sentence, it is possible to automatically generate semantic substitutions
that can even contain some of the cases mentioned above (which could not be
added to a general monolingual substitution list). The basic idea is to translate back and forth between two languages to find semantically similar words.
Assuming that the translation is accurate, the word in the source language can
help provide the necessary contextual information to limit the substitutions to
words that are semantically close in the current context.

dl-----~

Fig. 2. Example for a translation graph produced by the semantic substitution discovery algorithm. Here two witnesses (WI and W2) and the original word dl confirm
the semantic proximity of el and e2. There is no witness for ea, making ea an unlikely
candidate for semantic substitution.
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Suppose the source language is German (d) and the target language of the
translation is English (e). The original sentence contains a German word d 1
and the translation contains a word el which is a translation of d 1 . The basic
algorithm is the following:
- Find all other translations of d 1 , call this set E dl , E dl is the set of candidates
for semantic substitution. Naturally el E E d, .
- Find all translations of el, call this set De" This set is called the set of
witnesses.
- For each word e E Ed l - {Ed find all translations De and count the number
of elements in De n Del' If that number is above a given threshold t, add e
to the list of possible semantic substitutes for el'
A witness is a word in the source language that also translates to both words
in the target language, thereby confirming the semantic proximity of the two
words. The witness threshold t can be used to trade-off more possible substitutions against a higher potential for inappropriate substitutions.
The threshold does not have to be fixed. A heuristic can be used to increase
the threshold if the number of possible substitutions for a word or in a sentence is
extraordinarily high. Since the number of bits that can be encoded only increases
with log2 n for n possible substitutions we suggest to increase t whenever n is
larger than 8.
Examples: Given the German word "fein" and the English translation "nice",
the association algorithm run on the LEO (http://dict.leo.org/) dictionary gives
the following semantic substitutions: for three witnesses, only "pretty" is generated; for two witnesses, "fine" is added; for just one witness, the list grows by
"acute", "capillary", "dignified" and "keen". Without witnesses (direct translations), the dictionary adds "smooth" and "subtle". The word-pair "leicht" and
"light" gives "slight" (for three witnesses). However, "licht" and "light" gives
"bright" and "clear". In both cases the given substitutions match the semantics
of the specific German word.
5.3

Adding plausible mistakes

Another possible post-pass adds mistakes that are commonly made by MT systems to the translations. The transformations that our implementation can use
are based on the study of MT mistakes from section 4. The current system supports changing articles and prepositions using hand-crafted, language specific
substitutions that attempt to mimic the likely errors observed.
5.4

Results from the Prototype

Different configurations of the system produce translations of varying quality,
but even quality degradation is not predictable. Sometimes the generated modifications actually (by coincidence) improve the quality of the translation. For example, a good translation of the original French sentence "Dans toute la region, la
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vie est paralysee." into English would be "In the entire region, life is paralysed."
Google's translation is "In all the area, the life is paralysed." wheras LinguaTec
returns "In all of the region the life is crippled.". Applying article substitution
here can actually improve the translation: one of the choices generated by our
implementation is "In all of the region, life is crippled." Even aggressive settings
are still somewhat meaningful: "In all an area, a life is paralysed."
Der marokkanische Film" Windhorse" erziihlt die Geschichte zweier, unterschiedlichen
Generationen angehiirender Manner, die durch Marokko reisen. Auf dem Weg suchen
sie nach dem Einzigen, was ihnen wichtig ist: dem Sinn des Lebens.

Our prototype system gives the following translation:
The Moroccan film "Windhorse" tells story from men belonging by two, different
generations who travel through Morocco. They are looking for the only one which is
important to them on the way: the sense of a life.

For comparison, the source engine translations are also given:
Google: The Moroccan film "Windhorse" tells the history of two, different generations of belonging men, who travel by Morocco. On the way they look for the none one,
which is important to them: the sense of the life.
LinguaTec: The Moroccan film "Windhorse" tells the story of men belonging to
two, different generations who travel through Morocco. They are looking for the only
one which is important to them on the way: the meaning of the life.

The Babelfish translation is identical to the Google translation except that
"the none one" is replaced by "the only one" . LinguaTec provides some different
syntactic structures and lexical choices, but looks quite similar.
Clearly the addition of more engines would lead to more variety in the LiT
version. Sometimes substitutions lead to quality degradation ("belonging by"
vs. "belonging to"), and sometimes not ("sense of the life" vs. "sense of a life").
Sometimes the encoding makes the engine choose the better version of a section
of text to modify: "They are looking for the only one" vs. "they look for the
none one".
The original quality of the translations is not perfect. Furthermore, our version contains many of the same "differences" when compared to the source engines as the source engines have amongst themselves. Many of those differences
are introduced by us ("story from men" vs. "story of men") as opposed to coming directly from the source engines. While none of the texts are particularly
readable, our goal is to plausibly imitate machine-translated text, not to solve
the problem of perfect translation.
The example has most of prototype's transformations enabled in order to
achieve a higher bitrate. In general, this results in more degradation of the translation; decreasing the number of transformations might improve the quality, but
would also decrease the bitrate by offering fewer variations. More transformations and source engines may make the resulting text potentially more likely
to be flagged as suspicious by an adversary. For this example, we achieve a bitrate of 0.0164 uncompressed and 0.0224 compressed (9.33 bits per sentence);
different hidden texts would, due to the encoding scheme used, achieve different
bitrates. In general, we have found that the prototype gives us average bitrates
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of between 0.00265 and 0.00641 (uncompressed), and 0.00731 and 0.01671 (compressed), depending upon settings.
Bitrates and system configuration Figure 3 lists the different configurations
and bitrates that are achieved by our prototype. The data is only intended to give
a rough idea of the bitrates that can be achieved. An improved implementation
using more rules or more translation engines can likely achieve higher bitrates.
Also, it is impossible for us to give a precise metric for the quality of the generated
translations. Still, the Figure can be used to give an impression for the bitrates
that can be achieved with translation-based steganography. In order to allow for
a fair comparison with other steganographic systems that use binary data, such
as images, the bitrate is given for both uncompressed and compressed text.

Id Languages Engines SS-W
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

DE-EN
DE-EN
DE-EN
DE-EN
DE-EN
DE-EN
DE-EN
DE-EN
DE-EN
DE-EN
FR-EN
FR-EN
FR-EN
FR-EN
FR-EN
FR-EN
FR-EN
FR-EN
FR-EN

1,2
1,2
1,2
1,2
1,2
1,2
1,2
1,2
1,2
1,2
1,2
1,2
1,2
1,2
1,2
1,2
1,2
1,2
1,2

00

4
2
1
0
00
00

2
1
0
00

4
2
1
0
00
00

2
1

bitrate
error- Qualitypasses Limit ASCII-text compressed

-

(1)
(2)
(2)
(1)(2)
(1)(2)

(1)
(2)
(2)
(1)(2)

0.50
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.00
0.00
0.50
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.00

0.00226
0.00266
0.00178
0.00281
0.00488
0.00593
0.00247
0.00283
0.00632
0.00721
0.00246
0.00496
0.00535
0.00695
0.00696
0.00551
0.00264
0.00521
0.00818

0.00621
0.00731
0.00492
0.00776
0.01306
0.01585
0.00687
0.00779
0.01671
0.01907
0.00670
0.01344
0.01429
0.01834
0.01834
0.01486
0.00721
0.01401
0.02158

Fig. 3. Bitrates for the different configurations. Engine 1 is Coogle (16], Engine 2
is Linguatec (19]. SS-W lists the threshold for the number of witnesses in semantic
substitution (00 for no semantic substitutions). The error-passes are (1) articles and (2)
prepositions. The quality limit is the lower limit for the relative estimated translation
quality (see Section 6.3). The BR columns give the bitrate for plaintext and compressed
text, counting only the size of the generated translation (excluding the text in the source
language).

In order to give an idea of the generated translations for the different settings
(see Figure 3) we give translations for a German sentence (translated to English)
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and a French sentence (also translated to English). The original German sentences were "Gleich in den ersten Tagen nach der Katastrophe wies Unicef darauf
hin, dass die Kinder unter den Opfern des Seebebens am schwersten betroffen
sind. Wir sind heute in einem MaB von einer funktionierenden Infrastruktur
abhangig, wie es nie zuvor der Fall war." , which in English would be "Already
in the first days after the disaster, Unicef pointed out that children were hit
worst among the victims of the seaquake. Today, the extent of our dependency
on a working infrastructure is larger than ever." .
Google [16] translates this sentence as follows: "Directly in the first days
after the disaster Unicef pointed out that the children among the victims of
the sea-quake are most heavily concerned. We depend today in a measure on
a functioning infrastructure, as it was the case never before.". The Linguatec
engine returns "Is Unicef pointed out after the catastrophe within the first days
that the children are affected most heavily under the victims of the seaquake.
We are dependent in a measure of an operating infrastructure today how it the
case never was before."
If we add errors with the article substitution (1), we could translations such
as "Directly in the first days after the disaster Unicef pointed out that the
children among the victims of an sea-quake are most heavily concerned. We
depend today in a measure on a functioning infrastructure, as it was an case
never before." For prepositions, a possible result is "Directly in the first days
behind the disaster Unicef pointed out that the children among the victims of
the sea-quake are most heavily concerned. We depend today in a measure above
a functioning infrastructure, as it was the case never before."

6

Discussion

This section discusses various attacks on the steganographic encoding and possible defences against these attacks. The discussion is informal, as the system is
based on MT imperfections that are hard to analyze formally (which is one of
the reasons why MT is such a hard topic).
6.1

Future Machine Translation Systems

A possible problem that the presented steganographic encoding might face in
the future is significant progress in machine translation. If machine translation
were to become substantially more accurate, the possible margin of plausible
mistakes might get smaller. However, one large category of machine translation
errors today results from the lack of context that the machine translator takes
into consideration.
In order to significantly improve existing machine translation systems one
necessary feature would therefore be the preservation of context information
from one sentence to the next. Only with that information will it be possible to
eliminate certain errors. But introducing this context into the machine translation system also brings new opportunities for hiding messages in translations.
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Once machine translation software starts to keep context, it would be possible
for the two parties that use the steganographic protocol to use this context as a
secret key. By seeding their respective translation engines with k-bits of context
they can make deviations in the translations plausible, forcing the adversary to
potentially try 2k possible contextual inputs in order to even establish the possibility that the mechanism was used. This is similar to the idea of splitting the
corpus based on a secret key, with the difference that the overall quality of the
per-sentence translations would not be affected.
6.2

Repeated Sentence Problem

A general problem with any approach to hiding messages in the translation is
that if the text in the source language contains the same sentence twice it might
be translated into two different sentences depending on the value of the bit that
was hidden. Since machine translation systems (that do not keep context) would
always produce the same sentence this would allow an attacker to suspect the use
of steganography. The solution to this problem is to not use repeated sentences
in the source text to hide data, and always output the translation that was used
for the first occurence of the sentence.
This attack is similar to an attack in image steganography.1f an image is digitally altered, variations in the colors in certain implausible areas of the picture
might reveal the existence of a hidden message. Solving the problem is easier for
text steganography since it is easier to detect that two sentences are identical
than to detect that a series of pixels in an image belong to the same digitally
constructed shape and thus must have the same color.
6.3

Statistical Attacks

Statistical attacks have been extremely successful at defeating steganography
of images, audio and video (see, e.g., [13,20,25]). An adversary may have a
statistical model (e.g. a language model) that translations from all available MT
systems obey. For example, Zipf's law [21] states that the frequency of a word
is inversely proportional to its rank in the sorted-by-frequency list of all words.
Zipf's law holds for English, and in fact holds even within individual categories
such as nouns, verbs, adjectives, etc.
Assuming that all plausible translation engines generally obey such a statistical model, the steganographic encoder must be careful not to cause telltale
deviations from such distributions. Naturally, this is an arms race. Once such a
statistical law is known, it is actually easy to modify the steganographic encoder
to eliminate translations that deviate significantly from the required distributions. For example, Golle and Farahat [15] point out (in the different context
of encryption) that it is possible to extensively modify a natural language text
without straying noticeably from Zipf's law. In other words, this is a very manageable difficulty, as long as the steganographic system is made "Zipf-aware".
We cannot preclude the existence of yet-undiscovered language models for
translations that might be violated by our existing implementation. However,
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we expect that discovering and validating such a model is a non-trivial task
for the adversary. On the other hand, given such a model (as we pointed out
above) it is easy to modify the steganographic system so as to eliminate deviations by avoiding sentences that would be flagged. Section 7 sketches various
statistical models for attacks that might be useful against the existing prototype
implementation.
6.4

Use for Watermarking

The technique of this paper can be used for watermarking, in a manner that
does not require the original text (or any reference translation) for reading the
mark. The idea for not requiring the original in order to recover the message,
which was mentioned in Section 3.3, is now sketched in more detail.
We begin with a fragile version of the scheme. Let the bits of the mark be denoted by bl , ... , bn . Let kEN be a parameter that will be determined later. The
technique consists of using a (secret) random seed S as key for determining those
places where the n bits of the mark will be embedded. Let the random sequence
generated by the seed consist of numbers rl,' .. ,rk.n and let the corresponding
places in the text where the bits of the mark will be embedded be PI,·· . ,Pk.n
(with Pi denoting the spot for the i-th bit). Of course Pi is determined by rio
The p;'s are partitioned into groups of size k each. Let the resulting groups
be C I , ... , C n (CI consists of PI, ... ,Pk). In what follows P j will denote the
concatenation of the contents of the k positions Pi that are in group C j (so Pj
changes as the algorithm modifies those k positions - e.g., when the algorithm
replaces "cat" by "feline" that replacement is reflected within Pj ). Each Cj is
associated with Sj which is defined to be the least significant bit of Hs(Pj ) where
H s is a keyed cryptographic one-way hash function having S as key (recall that
S is the secret seed that determined the ri)'
As a result, Sj changes with 50% probability as Pj is modified. In order to
embed bj in Cj the algorithm "tortures C j until it confesses": C j is modified
until its Sj equals bj • Everyone of the k possible changes made within C j has
a 50% change of producing an Sj that equals the target bj , and the probability
that we fail e times is 2- e . A large choice for k will give the algorithm more room
for modifications and thus ensure that the embedding will fail with reasonably
low probability. It is possible to choose a small k and use an error-correcting
code in order to correct bits that could not be embedded properly.
The advantage of the scheme is that the receiver can receive all of the Sj from
the seed S without needing the original text or any reference baseline translation
of it: the received message and the seed are all that is required to retrieve the
mark.
More robust versions of the scheme can be obtained by using the techniques
described in [4], which include the use of markers (a marker is a sentence that
merely indicates that the group of contiguous sentences that immediately follow
it are watermark-carrying, so the marker is not itself watermark-carrying). One
of the ways of determining markers is by a secret (because keyed) ordering of the
sentences, the markers being the sentences that are lowest in that secret ordering
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- see [4) for details, and for an analysis that quantifies the scheme's resilience
against different kinds of attacks.

6.5

Other applications

While we have explored the possibility of using the inherent noise of natural
language translation to hide data, we suspect that there may be other areas
where transformation spaces exist which exhibit a similar lack of rigidity. For
example, compilers doing source translation have a variety of possible output
possibilities that still preserve semantics. Finding a way to hide information with
these possibilities while still mimicking the properties of various optimization and
transformation styles is a possibility for future work.

7

Statistical Attack Vectors

Statistical attacks fall into two categories. The first attacks the translation. The
translation models look at both the source and the target text. The second
category, language models, only look at the generated translations and try to
find inconsistencies within that text, without reference to the original text.

7.1

Translation Models

Word Count The average word count may yield a different ratio between
the source and target languages when steganography is in use. The rationale is
that the steganographic engine will discard words more readily than inserting
them (though, insertion of more words can occur in the current engine through
preposition substitution). An unmodified translation would then yield a higher
ratio of average number of words in the source language to the average number
of words in the target language compared to a text that had information hidden
in it.

Engine Errors Certain engines are given to certain types of errors. If a text
is translated by an engine and has no information hidden in it it should make
the errors characteristic to that engine 100% of the time. Taking the ratio of
the number of errors characteristic to one engine over the number of errors
characteristic to another should always yield a 0 or 1 (tolerance can be allowed in
case the user hand corrected some errors). If the ratio yields something outside
of that tolerance it can be seen that there are a mixture of error types, and
therefore a mixture of engines being used. Automatic classification of enginespecific errors is likely to be rather difficult. Also, if the translation engines used
by the encoder are unknown to the attacker this attack cannot be used.
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Language Model

Character Count The idea here is quite similar to the previous model. An
untouched translation will yield a lower ratio of average number of characters in
the source language to the average number in the target language. The rationale
here is when substitution occurs the substituted word is more likely to be more
complex and longer than the original translation.
Nouns Without Articles Since the current steganographic engine discards
articles for nouns on occasion and never inserts new ones (since it does not
have enough semantic knowledge to detect nouns) the total percentage of nouns
without articles should be higher for a text containing hidden information.
Witness Count When a semantic substitution is made by our system the word
that is chosen for replacement is likely to be more specific or complex than the
word that it is replacing. With that in mind the number of witnesses for the
word selected to hide information should ordinarily be lower than the word that
it is replacing. A normal translation should thus yield a higher ratio between
semantic substitution witnesses from the target to the source language than a
translation that contains a hidden message.

8

Conclusion

This paper introduced a new steganographic encoding scheme based on hiding messages in the noise that is inherent to natural language translation. The
steganographic message is hidden in the translation by selecting between multiple translations which are generated by either modifying the translation process
or by post-processing the translated sentences. In order to defeat the system,
an adversary has to demonstrate that the resulting translation is unlikely to
have been generated by any automatic machine translation system. A study of
common mistakes in machine translation was used to come up with plausible
modifications that could be made to the translations. It was demonstrated that
the variations produced by the steganographic encoding are similar to those of
various unmodified machine translation systems, demonstrating that it would be
impractical for an adversary to establish the existence of a hidden message. The
highest bitrate that our prototype could achieve with this new steganographic
encoding is about 0.01671.
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A

Extended Example

This section gives an extended example for running the tool on the first part
of the Communist Manifesto, translating from German to English with preposition substitution and semantics substitution with two witnesses. The output
text has the text "Hail, hail" embedded yeilding a bitrate of 0.00262 (0.00656
compressed).
A.I

Source Text

Die Geschichte aller bisherigen Gesellschaft ist die Geschichte von Klassenkampfen.
Freier und Sklave, Patrizier und Plebejer, Baron und Leibeigener, Zunftbiirger
und Gesell, kurz, Unterdriicker und Unterdriickte standen in stetem Gegensatz zueinander, fiihrten einen ununterbrochenen, bald versteckten, bald offenen Kampf, einen Kampf, der jedesmal mit einer revolutionaren Umgestaltung der ganzen Gesellschaft endete oder mit dem gemeinsamen Untergang der
kampfenden Klassen.
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In den friiheren Epochen der Geschichte finden wir fast iiberall eine vollstandige
Gliederung der Gesellschaft in verschiedene Stande, eine mannigfaltige Abstufung der gesellschaftlichen Stellungen. 1m alten Rom haben wir Patrizier, Ritter,
Plebejer, Sklaven; im Mittelalter Feudalherren, Vasallen, Zunftbiirger, Gesellen,
Leibeigene, und noch dazu in fast jeder dieser Klassen besondere Abstufungen.
Die aus dem Untergang der feudalen Gesellschaft hervorgegangene moderne
biirgerliche Gesellschaft hat die Klassengegensatze nicht aufgehoben. Sie hat
nur neue Klassen, neue Bedingungen der Unterdriickung, neue Gestaltungen des
Kampfes an die Stelle der alten gesetzt.
Unsere Epoche, die Epoche der Bourgeoisie, zeichnet sich jedoch dadurch
aus, daB sie die Klassengegensiitze vereinfacht hat. Die ganze Gesellschaft spaltet
sich mehr und mehr in zwei groBe feindliche Lager, in zwei groBe, einander direkt
gegeniiberstehende Klassen: Bourgeoisie und Proletariat.
Aus den Leibeigenen des Mittelalters gingen die Pfahlbiirger der ersten Stiidte
hervor; aus dieser Pfahlbiirgerschaft entwickelten sich die ersten Elemente der
Bourgeoisie.
Die Entdeckung Amerikas, die Umschiffung Afrikas schufen der aufkommenden Bourgeoisie ein neues Terrain. Der ostindische und chinesische Markt,
die Kolonisierung von Amerika, der Austausch mit den Kolonien, die Vermehrung
der Tauschmittel und der Waren iiberhaupt gaben dem Handel, der Schiffahrt,
der Industrie einen nie gekannten Aufschwung und damit dem revolutioniiren
Element in der zerfallenden feudalen Gesellschaft eine rasche Entwicklung.
Die bisherige feudale oder ziinftige Betriebsweise der Industrie reichte nicht
mehr aus fUr den mit neuen Miirkten anwachsenden Bedarf. Die Manufaktur
trat an ihre Stelle. Die Zunftmeister wurden verdrangt durch den industriellen
Mittelstand; die Teilung der Arbeit zwischen den verschiedenen Korporationen
verschwand vor der Teilung der Arbeit in der einzelnen Werkstatt selbst.
Aber immer wuchsen die Miirkte, immer stieg der Bedarf. Auch die Manufaktur reichte nicht mehr aus. Da revolutionierte der Dampf und die Maschinerie
die industrielle Produktion. An die Stelle der Manufaktur trat die moderne groBe
Industrie, an die Stelle des industriellen Mittelstandes traten die industriellen
Millionare, die Chefs ganzer industrieller Armeen, die modernen Bourgeois.
Die groBe Industrie hat den Weltmarkt hergestellt, den die Entdeckung Amerikas
vorbereitete. Der Weltmarkt hat dem Handel, der Schiffahrt, den Landkommunikationen eine unermefiliche Entwicklung gegeben. Diese hat wieder auf die
Ausdehnung der Industrie zuriickgewirkt, und in demselben MaBe, worin Industrie, Handel, Schiffahrt, Eisenbahnen sich ausdehnten, in demselben MaBe
entwickelte sich die Bourgeoisie, vermehrte sie ihre Kapitalien, drangte sie aIle
vom Mittelalter her iiberlieferten Klassen in den Hintergrund.
Wir sehen also, wie die moderne Bourgeoisie selbst das Produkt eines langen
Entwicklungsganges, einer Reihe von Umwiilzungen in der Produktions- und
Verkehrsweise ist.
Jede dieser Entwicklungsstufen der Bourgeoisie war begleitet von einem entsprechenden politischen Fortschritt . Unterdriickter Stand unter der Herrschaft der Feudalherren, bewaffnete und sich selbst verwaltende Assoziation in der Kommune
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(3), hier unabhangige stiidtische Republik , dort dritter steuerpflichtiger Stand
der Monarchie , dann zur Zeit der Manufaktur Gegengewicht gegen den Adel in
der standischen oder in der absoluten Monarchie , Hauptgrundlage der groBen
Monarchien iiberhaupt, erkampfte sie sich endlich seit der Herstellung der graBen
Industrie und des Weltmarktes im modernen Reprasentativstaat die ausschlief31iche
politische Herrschaft. Die moderne Staatsgewalt ist nur ein Ausschuf3, der die
gemeinschaftlichen Geschafte der ganzen Bourgeoisklasse verwaltet.
A.2

Output Text

The history of all past society is the history of class warfares.
Suitor and slave, Patrizier and Plebejer, Baran and body-own, Zunftbuerger
and join, Briefly, Eliminator and suppressed stood in constant contrast to each
other, Led a continuous, Soon hid, Soon open fight, A fight, a revolutionary
transformation to the whole society each time ended or the common fall of the
fighting classes.
In the earlier epochs of history we find nearly everywhere a complete arrangement of the society into different conditions, A diverse gradation of the social
positions. In old Rome we have Patrizier, Knight, Plebejer, Slaves; In the Middle
Ages feudal sirs, Vasallen, Zunftbuerger, Skilled workers, Body-own, And still to
it in nearly of these classes special gradations.
The modern civil society come out from the fall of the feudalen society did
not waive the class contrasts. It has only new classes, New conditions of the
oppression, New organizations of the fight to the place of the old set.
Our epoch, The epoch of the bourgeoisie, Stands out, however, due to it,
That it simplified the class contrasts. The whole society splits in two large hostile
camps more and more, Into two great ones, Each other directly facing classes:
Bourgeoisie and proletariat.
From the body-own of the Middle Ages the stake citizens of the first cities
followed; From stake citizenry the first elements of the Bourgeoisie developed.
The discovery America, A new land created the sailing around of Africa
for the paying bourgeoisie. The East Indian and Chinese market, Colonizing
of America, The exchange with the colonies, The increase of the mediums of
exchange and the goods gave the trade at all, Shipping, The industry an upswing and thus, never known, the revolutionary element in the feudalen society
disintegrating a rapid development.
The past feudale or zuenftige mode of operation of the industry was not
enough any longer out for the need increasing with new markets. The manufactory took its job. The guild masters were replaced by the industrial middle
classes; The division of the work between the different Korporationen disappeared before the division of the work in the individual workshop.
But the markets always grew, The need always rose. Also the manufaktur
was not sufficient. The steam and the machinery revolutionized the industrial
production there. The modern large industry took the place of the manufactory,
To the place of the industriellen of middle class the industriellen millionaires
stepped, The bosses of whole industrieller armies, The modern Bourgeois.
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The large industry manufactured the world market, The discovery of America prepared this one. The world market has the trade, Shipping, An immense
development given to the country communications. This has reacted again upon
the extension of the industry, And in the same measure, Into what industry,
Trade, Shipping, Railways expanded, In the same himself developed mass for
the bourgeoisie, Increased it its capitals, She pressed all classes handed down
here of the Middle Ages to the background.
So we see, Like the modern Bourgeoisie themselves the product of a long
development course, A set of circulations in production and traffic way is. Each
of these entwicklungsstufen of the Bourgeoisie was accompanied of appropriate
political progress.

